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Reactor Actions

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Materials Actions
[Reed College \(Reed Research Reactor Facility\) EA-08-339](#)
[2011](#)
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On December 19, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. Specifically, the facility was operated at a power level in excess of the licensed full power limit of 250 kW for approximately 70 minutes, which is in violation of their Technical Specifications. This event was caused by a disagreement between the indicated and calculated power due to the installation of a new fuel element into the core.

Individual Actions
[Southern California Edison Company \(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station\) EA-08-296](#)
[2011](#)
[2010](#)
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On December 19, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings." Specifically, maintenance and work control personnel failed to develop appropriate instructions or procedures, and failed to include quantitative or qualitative steps to ensure the maintenance activities on safety-related batteries were satisfactorily completed. This failure resulted in a safety-related battery being inoperable between March 2004 and March 25, 2008.

Non-Licensee Actions
[Dominion Energy Kewaunee Inc. \(Kewaunee Power Station\) EA-08-223](#)
[2011](#)
[2010](#)
[2009](#)
[2008](#)

On October 29, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination finding. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that Kewaunee's emergency plan emergency action levels specifying instrument threshold values were beyond the limits of the effluent radiation monitors' capabilities to accurately measure and indicate. As a result, action directed by the State and local emergency response plans, which rely on information provided by the licensee, could have potentially delayed minimum initial offsite response measures.

Fuel Cycle Facilities
[Duke Power Company, LLC \(McGuire Nuclear Station\) EA-08-220](#)
[2011](#)
[2010](#)
[2009](#)
[2008](#)
[2007](#)

On October 27, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The violation involved the failure to take adequate corrective action related to the service water strainer backwash system. Specifically, a plant modification implemented to address a macro-fouling concern associated with the service water strainers (1) utilized non-safety-related instrument air to support backwash operations, and (2) did not account for the impact on timely operator response following a safety injection signal or loss of instrument air. As a result, there was a lack of reasonable assurance that the service water system would have been capable of performing its safety-related function during a time of high fouling potential. The finding does not represent a current safety concern because temporary modifications and appropriate procedural changes have been made to address periods of potential macro-fouling.

[Florida Power & Light Co. \(St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant\) EA-08-172](#)

On October 20, 2008 a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to Florida Power & Light Co. to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement agreement, regarding a violation of site security procedures caused by the deliberate actions of one of the security operations supervisors at the licensee's St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. The security operations supervisor willfully permitted two containers into the protected area without conducting the required search of their contents.

[Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. \(Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Station\) EA-08-192](#)

On September 4, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, as a result of overhaul of its 1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. The violation cited the licensee for failure to install a new exhaust header system correctly, as required by vendor documents, causing the 1B EDG to be declared inoperable.

[Nebraska Public Power District \(Cooper Nuclear Station\) EA-08-124](#)

On August 1, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding to Nebraska Public Power District involving a violation of Technical Specifications which requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained. Specifically, an inadequate work order instruction and maintenance procedure resulted in a loose electrical connection on an emergency diesel generator and the subsequent failure of the diesel generator.

[Nebraska Public Power District \(Cooper Nuclear Station\) EA-07-204](#)

On June 13, 2008, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings." Specifically, between 1997 and June, 2007, the licensee failed to ensure that two emergency operating procedures which were used to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition in the event of certain postulated fire scenarios would work as written. Additionally, the licensee failed to properly verify and validate procedure steps to ensure that they would work to accomplish the necessary actions.

[Constellation Energy \(Ginna Nuclear Plant\) EA-08-075](#)

On April 7, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation, due to changes the licensee made to its NRC approved emergency plan; specifically they made changes to the emergency action levels (EALs), between 1996 and 2001, without first obtaining Commission approval. This decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan. The violation cited the licensee for not following 10 CFR 50.54(q), which requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in appendix E of this part.

[Exelon Generation Company, LLC \(Byron Station\) EA-08-046](#)

On April 1, 2008, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued for violations associated with a White Significance Determination Finding. The NOV involved violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions", and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control". Specifically, the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions after the identification of extensive corrosion on essential service water riser pipes and failed to verify the adequacy of the methodology and design inputs in calculations that supported the decision to accept three degraded essential service water riser pipes for continued service.

[Luminant Generation Company, LLC \(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station\) EA-08-028](#)

On February 29, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of the Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," which requires that while the plant is in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) shall be operable. From November 1, 2007, through November 21, 2007, while the plant was in Mode 1, one of the two DGs capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) was inoperable, and action was not taken to either restore the DG to an operable status within 72 hours or be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 36 hours. Specifically, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-02 was made inoperable as a result of painting activities due to paint having been deposited and remaining on at least one fuel rack in a location that prevented motion required to support the operation of the EDG. This condition caused EDG 1-02 to fail to start during a surveillance test on November 21, 2007.

[Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. \(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station\) EA-08-006](#)

On January 24, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of \$650,000 was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. This action was based on a

continuing SL III violation of the NRC's January 31, 2006, Confirmatory Order to implement Section 651(b) of the Energy Policy Act (Act) of 2005. The Order required Entergy to install backup power for the Indian Point Alert and Notification System (ANS) by January 31, 2007. The NRC subsequently extended, at the licensee's request, the implementation date to April 15, 2007. On April 23, 2007, the staff issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of \$130,000 when Entergy failed to meet the April 15, 2007, implementation date. On July 30, 2007, the NRC issued an Order to supplement the requirements of the January 31, 2006, Confirmatory Order, based on Entergy's proposed corrective actions for noncompliance with the Confirmatory Order. On August 30, 2007, the staff issued a subsequent Notice of Violation for Entergy's failure to place the new ANS in service by August 24, 2007, as required by the July 30, 2007, Order. As of April 16, 2007, the licensee remains in violation of the Orders.

[Florida Power and Light Company \(Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 & 4\)
EA-07-110, EA-07-113, EA-07-116, EA-07-119](#)

On January 22, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of \$208,000 was issued for a Severity Level II problem consisting of (1) the licensee's failure to ensure, on or about April of 2004, that each of its armed responders was equipped with a contingency weapon in accordance with an NRC Order issued on February 25, 2002, Section B.4(f); (2) the licensee's failure to ensure, on or about August 2005, that each of its armed responders was equipped with a contingency weapon in accordance with the licensee Physical Security Plan; (3) a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, incomplete and inaccurate information; and (4) the failure of the licensee to make a one hour report to the NRC as required in 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, Paragraph 1.1(a)(3).

[Southern California Edison Company \(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station\) EA-07 232](#)

On January 11, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Southern California Edison Company (SCE) to formalize commitments made as a result of a successful alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session. The commitments were made by SCE as part of a settlement agreement between SCE and the NRC concerning the falsification, by a contract fire protection specialist at SONGS, of firewatch certification sheets on numerous occasions from April 2001 to December 2006. As part of the settlement agreement, SCE agreed to, in general terms, performing a common cause evaluation of known recent events, conducting a safety culture assessment, conducting training and communications, and developing or enhancing various programs in areas such as ethics, disciplinary process, contract programs, and oversight. In recognition of these actions, and those corrective actions already completed, NRC will refrain from further enforcement action related to this particular case, and may exercise enforcement discretion for the next six months on willful cases that meet the conditions of Section VII.B.4 of the Enforcement Policy, "Violations Identified Due to Previous Enforcement Action." NRC will evaluate the implementation of SCE's commitments during future inspections.

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